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Historic abuse-the saga continues 
Eleanor J Russell  
Glasgow Caledonian University 
 
The author revisits the issue of prescription and limitation of 
actions in the context of historic abuse under reference to the 
recent decision in K v Marist Brothers [2017] CSIH 2. 
 
Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed a steady stream of cases in the 
Scottish courts in which adult pursuers have sought reparation in 
respect of abuse allegedly inflicted upon them in childhood. Given 
the historic nature of the claims, most of the cases have failed 
owing to the application of the statutory provisions found in the 
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973. K v Marist 
Brothers [2017] CSIH 2 is the latest in a long line of such cases. 
Once again, as in so many of the cases which have gone before it, 
the outcome in K would prove unfavourable to the pursuer. In this 
article, the author examines the alleged facts and legal issues 
which arose in K and suggests that, until such time as legal reform 
is effected, such cases face limited prospects of success.  
 
The law 
The modern law on prescription and limitation is found in the 
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, as amended. The 
key distinction between the two concepts is that prescription 
serves to extinguish an obligation, whereas limitation merely bars 
a right of action. (“Limitation…deprives the litigant of a forensic 
remedy but does not extinguish his right”- Ministry of Defence v 
Iraqi Civilians [2016] U.K.S.C. 25 per Lord Sumption at para.1.) 
(See, also, the dictum of Lord Justice Clerk Cooper in Macdonald v 
North of Scotland Bank 1942 S.C. 369 at p.373). The focus in this 
article is, of course, on actions and obligations arising from 
personal injuries and the discussion is restricted accordingly. 
As far as obligations to make reparation in respect of personal 
injuries are concerned, such obligations are not subject to the 
short negative prescription of five years (1973 Act, s.6 and Sch.1, 
para.2 (g)). Nor are such obligations any longer subject to the long 
negative prescription of twenty years (1973 Act, s.7(2)). The 
removal of such obligations from the operation of the long negative 
prescription was effected by the Prescription and Limitation 
(Scotland) Act 1984, s.6(1), Sch.1, para. 2. That amendment was 
not retrospective in nature however (1984 Act, s.5(3)). As a result, 
any such obligations which had already prescribed before the 
coming into force of the 1984 Act remained extinguished. The 
1984 Act came into force on September 26, 1984. To determine 
the date on which such “already extinguished” obligations 
prescribed, it is necessary to ascertain the starting date of the 
twenty year period. Sections 7(1) and 11 of the 1973 Act provide 
that time runs from the date on which the obligation becomes 
enforceable. That will be either (1) the date on which the loss, 
injury or damage occurred, or (2) in the case of a continuing 
wrong, with damage occurring before its cessation, the date on 
which the wrong ceased. In K v Gilmartin’s Executrix 2004 S.C. 
784 the pursuer alleged that he had been abused by a 
schoolteacher between 1955 and 1961. The Inner House held that 
the obligation became enforceable at the end of 1961 and was 
thus extinguished by the long negative prescription in 1981. It 
would appear to be implicit in the First Division’s judgment that the 
pursuer’s loss resulted from a continuing wrong.  
In summary, obligations arising from personal injury are subject to 
neither the short nor the long negative prescription, with the 
proviso that where injury was sustained or a continuing wrong 
ceased before September 26, 1964, such obligations (barring any 
relevant claim or relevant acknowledgment) will have been 
extinguished by the long negative prescription. Periods of legal 
disability (i.e. nonage and unsoundness of mind) and lack of 
awareness of injury do not prevent the running of the long negative 
prescription.  
 
Actions for personal injury are however subject to rules of 
limitation. The main statutory provision is s.17 of the 1973 Act 
which provides for a three year period of limitation (the 
“triennium”). The period runs from (1) the date on which the 
injuries were sustained or, if later, the date on which a continuing 
wrong ceased (in terms of s.17(2)(a)) or (2) the date on which the 
pursuer became actually or constructively aware of three statutory 
facts (in terms of s.17(2)(b)). These facts are (i) that the injuries 
were sufficiently serious to justify bringing an action (on the 
assumption that the defender does not dispute liability and is able 
to satisfy a decree) (ii) that the injuries were attributable to an act 
or omission and (iii) that the defender was a person to whose act 
or omission the injuries were attributable or the employer or 
principal of such a person. A lack of awareness of a right of legal 
action is not relevant to this analysis (1973 Act, s.22(3)). Thus, 
time runs against the pursuer who is aware of the three statutory 
facts even if he is unaware that he has a right of action. Many 
historic abuse cases have emphasised this point-see, for example, 
Stephen Findleton v Quarriers [2006] CSOH 157 (at paras.61 and 
64). 
The date of constructive awareness (i.e. the date on which it was 
“reasonably practicable” for the pursuer to become aware of the 
statutory facts) may predate the date of actual awareness of the 
statutory facts (see Elliot v J & C Finney 1989 S.L.T. 208). 
The awareness provision is of particular relevance in latent 
disease cases where the pursuer is initially unaware that he has 
suffered injury or in cases where the pursuer has suffered injury 
but attributed it erroneously to say the ageing process rather than 
to a legal wrong or perhaps where the pursuer is initially unable to 
identify the correct defender (for example, in a “hit and run” 
incident). While attempts have been made to invoke the 
awareness provision in the context of historic abuse in an effort to 
delay the commencement of the limitation period, such attempts 
have been unsuccessful.  
Section 17(3) of the Act provides that “[i]n the computation of the 
[limitation period] there shall be disregarded any time during which 
the person who sustained the injuries was under legal disability by 
reason of nonage or unsoundness of mind.” It follows that time 
does not begin to run against a child until he or she attains the age 
of 16 (Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s.1(2)). (Prior to 
the 1991 Act, time did not run until the young person attained the 
age of 18.) 
Section 19A of the 1973 Act confers a power on the court, if it 
considers it equitable to do so, to permit an action to be brought 
notwithstanding the provisions of s.17.  
 
Application of the law in historic abuse cases 
Given that it is the very nature of “historic” abuse cases that the 
events complained of occurred many years ago, attempts have 
been made by victims of such abuse to mobilise some of the 
statutory provisions (most notably the provisions on lack of 
awareness and the equitable discretion) in an effort to maintain 
their actions. Survivors of abuse have largely failed in such 
attempts. Recently, however, in K v Marist Brothers [2017] CSIH 2, 
an attempt was made to rely on the unsoundness of mind 
provision in s.17(3) of the 1973 Act in an effort to delay the running 
of the limitation period. This, too, failed. The reasons for the failure 
of that argument will be examined below. 
First, however, a brief review of litigation to date demonstrates the 
lack of success experienced by survivors in their attempts to 
progress their actions.  
 
An awareness argument has been invoked without success in 
several historic abuse cases. Thus, in a case involving alleged 
abuse at Nazareth House in Glasgow it was held that a lack of 
awareness of an entitlement to sue until newspaper articles 
highlighted institutional abuse did not serve to engage s.17(2)(b) of 
the 1973 Act: B v Murray (No. 1) 2004 S.L.T. 967. When that case 
reached the Inner House - reported as AS v Poor Sisters of 
Nazareth 2007 S.C. 688 - the pursuers argued that awareness of 
the first statutory fact concerning sufficient seriousness of injuries 
involved not only the issue of quantum but also consideration of 
whether a pursuer would realise that the injury called for resort to 
litigation. It was argued that the pursuers belonged to a class of 
persons who were afflicted by the “silencing effect” of the abuse 
which they claimed to have suffered. They came from poor family 
backgrounds, felt shame and embarrassment, lacked confidence 
and did not think that they would be believed. Until alerted by 
media reports that they could claim damages they were not aware 
that their injuries were sufficiently serious to justify bringing an 
action. That argument was roundly rejected by the Inner House, 
Lord President Hamilton observing that given that the statutory fact 
proceeds on the basis that liability and solvency of the defender 
are assumed and that knowledge of actionability is irrelevant “the 
subhead is concerned only with the extent of the injury, in terms of 
quantum of damages” (at para.25). The pursuers’ pleadings 
demonstrated that they did not seek to advance a case that they 
were unaware that the injuries were of sufficient gravity to warrant 
proceedings on the statutory assumptions. Rather, the averments 
contended “for an immediate and thereafter successive continuing 
injury in the shape of the initial alleged physical assaults and other 
deficits in the standard of care, leading to psychological difficulties; 
the loss of employment opportunities; and loss of earnings 
following their leaving Nazareth House” (at para.28).  
Lord Eassie made similar observations regarding quantum in CG v 
Glasgow City Council 2011 S.C. 1. That case arose from abuse 
alleged to have been inflicted upon the pursuer at Kerelaw 
Residential School between 1992 and 1995. The summons was 
not served until 2007. The pursuer averred that, at the time of the 
incidents, she did not regard herself as having been injured 
sufficiently seriously to justify the bringing of an action. Lord Eassie 
commented (at para.30) that such an averment did not really 
address the collective protracted history of the alleged abuse. 
Delivering the opinion of an Extra Division, he stated (at para.31): 
“In our view, it cannot be said that the catalogue of physical and 
serious sexual abuse of which the pursuer now complains would 
not have furnished, on her leaving the school, a claim of damages 
of sufficient magnitude to make worthwhile the raising of 
proceedings - again, of course, on the important statutory 
assumptions. In other words, it cannot be said that the damages 
which would be awarded to the pursuer in respect of that abuse 
would be so small as not to justify the taking of steps by way of 
litigation on those particular statutory assumptions.” 
A lack of awareness was once again prayed in aid by the pursuer 
in M v O’Neill 2006 S.L.T. 823. An action in respect of 
psychological injuries was raised in 2000 in respect of systematic 
abuse said to have been inflicted upon the pursuer at Smyllum 
Orphanage in the late 1960s. The pursuer asserted that she did 
not have the requisite awareness until 1997 when she was first 
made aware that she could make a claim following publication of a 
newspaper article. As far as the second and third statutory facts 
were concerned, Lord Glennie held that the pursuer was linking 
her distressed mental state to the abuse (i.e. the act or omission of 
the defenders) long before the newspaper articles began to 
emerge and from the late 1970s at the latest. (See paras.72 and 
77). As far as the first statutory fact was concerned, Lord Glennie 
acknowledged (at para.77) that he had “more difficulty” in fixing a 
date on which the pursuer had awareness that her injuries were 
“sufficiently serious” to justify bringing an action. Earlier in his 
opinion, Lord Glennie had stated (at para.33):  
“It seems to follow from [the] two statutory assumptions [of 
admitted liability and solvency], that the factors relevant to an 
awareness of whether the injuries are “sufficiently serious to justify 
his bringing an action of damages” will be circumscribed...The 
question whether it is worthwhile bringing an action of damages 
will be judged substantially by reference to matters of quantum (“is 
it worth suing to get such and such an award?”)”. 
Lord Glennie continued (at para.77): 
“[I]t seems to me clear from the account of her problems in the late 
1980s, as described to [a psychologist working at the Keil Centre], 
that she knew by then that the psychological difficulties from which 
she was suffering were very significant. What she did not know 
then was that there was a possibility of bringing an action against 
the defenders. This is not a material consideration in terms of the 
section.” 
On the question of constructive awareness, Lord Glennie said this 
(at para.36): 
“Feelings of inadequacy, embarrassment, reluctance to come 
forward, fear of being disbelieved, and the like, may be entirely 
understandable and provide a reasonable excuse for not taking the 
matter further at a particular time, but they do not touch on the 
practicability of finding out, the only issue with which s.17(2)(b) is 
concerned.”  
Any gaps in the pursuer’s actual awareness were filled, in Lord 
Glennie’s view, by constructive awareness. It was reasonably 
practicable for the pursuer to have obtained awareness. The 
pursuer “had every opportunity of explaining her problems to the 
professionals with whom she was put in touch…had she done so, 
she would have been given appropriate help and referred, as 
necessary, to others who could help” (para.78). While that may not 
have led to an awareness of the possibility of legal proceedings, 
that was not required in terms of the legislation.  
In McE v de La Salle Brothers 2007 S.C. 556 the pursuer’s action 
arose from abuse said to have been inflicted upon him at St 
Ninian’s residential school, Stirling between 1963 and 1966. The 
action was commenced in May 2000. The issue of repressed 
memory featured in the pursuer’s pleadings. It was said that, until 
he underwent therapy, the consequences of the abuse were such 
that the victim did not possess the awareness required by 
s.17(2)(b). The Inner House held that the action had suffered 
limitation. The pursuer’s pleadings indicated that he was aware 
that he had been subject to very serious assaults and “it would be 
absurd if a claimant could avoid the consequences of s.17(2)(b) by 
saying that he had put to the back of his mind his actual 
awareness of the statutory facts” (per Lord Osborne at para.173). 
There was no statutory basis for the running of time to be 
interrupted by suppressed memory or induced reticence.  
More recently in D v Murray [2012] CSOH 109; 2012 G.W.D. 24-
503 it was held that the pursuer’s belief that nobody would listen to 
his complaints of abuse (said to have been inflicted upon him while 
he was resident in Nazareth House, Aberdeen in the 1970s), did 
not amount to a lack of awareness on his part. Lord Drummond 
Young stated (at para.13): 
“The pursuer avers that while he was still in Nazareth House he 
and his brothers complained to a named trainee social worker 
about the home and about Sister Mary Margaret in particular. He 
further avers that he had nightmares about the home throughout 
his teenage and adult life. His problem was not a lack of 
knowledge about what happened to him, nor about the 
seriousness of what had happened, nor about who was 
responsible, but because he had not thought that anyone would 
listen to his complaints about the home until he read the press 
articles during the summer of 1997. That does not, however, 
satisfy the criteria in section 17(2)(b).” 
The pursuer’s averments that he did not have the requisite 
awareness until newspaper articles were published in 1997 were 
directly contradicted by the averments noted above by Lord 
Drummond Young. His Lordship continued (at para.14): 
“[A]ll that the newspaper articles in 1997 are said to have done 
was to make the pursuer aware that his complaints might be taken 
seriously. That does not involve his discovery of knowledge 
relating to his ill-treatment in the home. Section 17(2)(b), however, 
relates to the pursuer's coming aware of certain specified facts 
which relate to his injuries, their attribution and the position of the 
defender; these do not include the proposition that the pursuer's 
complaints might not be taken seriously. The statutory facts set out 
in that provision are not concerned with knowledge of action ability, 
but only with the extent and seriousness of the injuries and the 
responsibility of the defender.” 
 
A similarly parsimonious approach has been taken to the equitable 
extension in the context of historic abuse. Thus, the House of 
Lords refused to exercise the s.19A discretion in AS v Poor Sisters 
of Nazareth 2008 S.C. (H.L.) 146, thereby endorsing the decisions 
of the Inner House (2007 S.C. 688) and the Lord Ordinary (2005 
S.L.T. 982). Lord Hope, with whose opinion all the other judges in 
the House of Lords agreed, stated (at para.25): 
“The issue on which the court must concentrate is whether the 
defender can show that, in defending the action, there will be the 
real possibility of significant prejudice. As McHugh J pointed out in 
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (p 255) it 
seems more in accord with the legislative policy that the pursuer's 
lost right should not be revived than that the defender should have 
a spent liability reimposed on him. The burden rests on the party 
who seeks to obtain the benefit of the remedy. The court must, of 
course, give full weight to his explanation for the delay and the 
equitable considerations that it gives rise to. But proof that the 
defender will be exposed to the real possibility of significant 
prejudice will usually determine the issue in his favour.”  
The House of Lords held that the Lord Ordinary (Lord Drummond 
Young) had been entitled to reach his conclusion that the prejudice 
caused to the defender by the lapse of time in raising the 
proceedings (including the loss of evidence that resulted from it) 
was, by itself, a sufficient reason for not allowing the actions to 
proceed under s.19A. 
AS was followed in SF v Quarriers 2016 S.C.L.R. 111. The abuse 
there was said to have occurred in a care home between 1965 and 
1971 and to have resulted in long term psychological damage to 
the pursuer. The action was raised in 2004 against the operators 
of the care home on the grounds of their vicarious liability. Lord 
Bannatyne refused to allow the action to proceed. The factors 
which favoured the exercise of the court's discretion were far 
outweighed by the significant prejudice to the defender were the 
action to proceed. The defender could not receive a fair trial. The 
pursuer’s alleged tormentor (Miss D) had died in 1980 and the 
operators of the home would therefore be denied the evidence of 
the person who would have been their most important witness. 
They would not be able properly to defend themselves. Moreover, 
it would not only be difficult to find other witnesses who had been 
present in the house with the pursuer at the material time, but also 
inappropriate for the defender to make unsolicited approaches to 
such persons. Other staff members working in other parts of the 
care home would not be in a position to give any real insight into 
what might have happened. In any event, “the most serious 
allegations of abuse made by the pursuer against Miss D appear 
to have happened in private and at night” (at para.157). The 
events complained of ended 33 years before the action was 
raised, leading to a decline in the quality of the available evidence. 
Social mores had changed in the last 40 years and it would be 
difficult to reconstruct social attitudes of the 1960s. In addition, the 
defender’s position had been significantly prejudiced by the 
change in the law of vicarious liability effected by Lister v Hesley 
Hall Ltd [2002] 1 A.C. 215. The litigation had already been 
protracted and as the pursuer was legally aided, any award of 
expenses in the defender’s favour would not be recoverable.   
In M v O’Neill 2006 S.L.T. 823 (discussed above in the context of 
awareness) the court once again refused to exercise its discretion 
under s.19A. Its exercise would have resulted in considerable 
prejudice to the defenders. They would have been required to 
defend an action in respect of events which were alleged to have 
occurred some 35 years earlier. Such a lengthy delay leads 
inevitably to loss of evidence and a decline in its quality. A fair trial 
was no longer possible and the action was dismissed. 
 
An application under s.19A was again refused in D v Murray [2012] 
CSOH 109. The Lord Ordinary held that the pursuer had failed to 
give a cogent explanation for the delay in raising proceedings. The 
fact that he did not turn his mind to the possibility of litigation until 
he saw press coverage in 1997 (concerning abuse in children’s 
homes) had been expressly rejected as a relevant factor for 
exercising the discretion in AS v Poor Sisters of Nazareth. The 
pursuer’s averments that he could not reasonably have been 
expected to commence adversarial litigation before he read the 
press articles, and that the delay in raising the action was 
attributable to the pursuer's treatment by a particular nun lacked 
sufficient specification to permit proof. In particular, nothing was 
said about the psychological processes whereby treatment at the 
hands of the nun should cause the pursuer not to proceed with his 
action. Furthermore, the likelihood of significant prejudice to the 
defenders was “very clear indeed” (para.22). Defending the action 
would be especially difficult where many years had elapsed since 
the events in question. In addition, attitudes towards the physical 
punishment of children had changed dramatically in the intervening 
period, and that in itself “lends a particularly difficult dimension to 
the assessment of events that happened more than 30 years ago” 
(para.20).  
In W v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of St Andrews 
and Edinburgh [2013] CSOH 185, the pursuer sought damages in 
respect of sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated some 20 years 
earlier by a priest while the pursuer was a school pupil. The action 
which was directed against the archdiocese was held to have 
suffered limitation and the pursuer’s averments anent s.19A were 
held to be irrelevant. The issue of prejudice to the archdiocese 
rested on the priest’s death in 2006 and the 20 year gap between 
the cessation of the alleged abuse and the service of the 
summons. The archdiocese would be exposed to the real 
possibility of significant, and most likely inevitable, prejudice in 
defending the action. There were real concerns about the quality of 
evidence which could be led in any evidential hearing and there 
would also be substantial concern about the breach of fair trial 
protections. The action was dismissed.  
 
As far as the author is aware, the only successful application for 
relief under s.19A in the context of historic abuse is found in the 
case of A v N 2015 S.L.T. 289. A was born on 10 December 1967. 
She raised an action in January 2004 against her uncle in respect 
of a course of sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated between 1975 
and 1997 (from when she was seven years old until she was 30). 
Although the action was held to be time barred, the Lord Ordinary 
(Lord Kinclaven) held that it was equitable to allow it to proceed. 
The fact that A became emotionally dependent upon N as a child, 
and that N continued to exploit the pursuer throughout her adult life 
were both factors which might be relevant to explain the delay in 
raising proceedings. The first person to inform A in any meaningful 
manner that she had a possible right of action for damages did so 
in 2003, and thereafter, a claim was brought expeditiously. N had 
not suffered any real prejudice in his ability to defend the action. 
The Lord Ordinary’s decision was subsequently upheld by the 
Inner House.  
 
K v Marist Brothers–the alleged facts 
Attention now turns to the case of K v Marist Brothers, where, for 
the first time in the Scottish courts, an “unsoundness of mind” 
argument was advanced in the context of historic abuse. The case 
also involved consideration of the equitable discretion and the long 
negative prescription.  
The pursuer, who was born in October 1955, alleged that he had 
been physically and sexually abused while he was a boarding pupil 
at St Columba’s School, Largs, in the early 1960s. The pursuer 
averred that, as a result of the abuse, he suffered anxiety, 
depression, low mood, difficulty in concentration and that his 
personality was adversely affected. The abuse was said to have 
been perpetrated by a certain Brother Germanus who was 
responsible for the dormitory arrangements at the school. It was 
that role which had afforded him the opportunity to commit the 
abuse. The school was run by the Marist Brothers, the defenders 
in the action, upon whom the summons was served in July 2015. 
As far as the delay in coming forward was concerned, the pursuer 
claimed to have been threatened by Brother Germanus that if he 
told of “our little secret” he would never see his deceased younger 
brother in heaven. As a young child, being taught at a Catholic 
School, the pursuer accepted “as the Gospel truth” what 
Brother Germanus had told him. The threat affected him deeply 
and prevented him coming forward with the allegations until 2013. 
It was the pursuer’s “absolute belief” that if he ever spoke of the 
abuse he would not see his deceased brother again. He was beset 
with feelings of guilt, shame and cowardice.  
 
Outer House Decision [2016] CSOH 54 
The matter came before Lady Wolffe for a preliminary proof on 
prescription and limitation. For the pursuer, evidence was led from 
the pursuer himself, from his wife and from Brother Ronald 
McEwan. The defenders led evidence from only one witness, 
Brother Brendan Geary. There were three legal issues which arose 
before the Lord Ordinary, as follows: (1) whether the obligation had 
prescribed (2) if the obligation had not prescribed, whether the 
action had suffered limitation and (3) if the action was time barred, 
whether it should be allowed to proceed under the equitable 
discretion. The case was disposed of by Lady Wolffe on the basis 
that the obligation had been extinguished by the long negative 
prescription. The statutory removal of obligations to make 
reparation for personal injury from the ambit of the long negative 
prescription was not retrospective with the result, as stated by 
Lady Wolffe (at para.72), that “the long negative prescription 
continued to apply to any obligation to make reparation for any act 
or omission completed prior to 26 September 1964.” For the 
purposes of the preliminary proof, the abuse was assumed to be 
co-extensive with the pursuer’s attendance at the School. In 
evidence, however, the pursuer was unable to recall if he began at 
St Columba’s in the summer before he turned 7 (i.e. summer 
1962), or the summer after that (i.e. summer 1963). He was at the 
school for no more than about two years. If the pursuer started at 
St Columba’s before he turned 7, he would have left in the summer 
of 1964 whereas if he started just short of his 8th birthday, his 
second year would have ended in the summer of 1965. The Lord 
Ordinary concluded that the pursuer’s evidence failed to establish 
that he attended the school on or after 26 September 1964, that 
date being “of critical importance” (at para.73). Accordingly, the 
obligation was extinguished by the long negative prescription. 
In addressing the matter of prescription, Lady Wolffe noted that the 
1973 Act contained no express provision on the onus of proof. She 
stated (at para.74): 
“In the absence of such provision, the general rule is that the party 
affirming a proposition has the burden of proving it. However, the 
affirmative proposition can be framed in a number of ways: for the 
pursuer, it is that a substantive claim subsists, notwithstanding the 
passage of time; for the defender, it is that the pursuer’s claim has 
been extinguished by prescription. The question of onus in this 
context is not free from difficulty.” 
In the absence of full argument on the issue, Lady Wolffe inclined 
to the view that the onus of proof was on the pursuer. Such a view 
was consistent with the observation of J F Wheatley, QC, in 
Richardson v Quercus (unreported, 25 March 1997) to the effect 
that once the issue of prescription has been raised it is for the 
pursuer to establish that his right subsists. Lady Wolffe’s approach 
was also consistent with the decision of Lord Menzies in Pelagic 
Freezing (Scotland) Ltd v Lovie Construction Ltd [2010] CSOH 
145.   
Because Lady Wolffe concluded that the pursuer had failed to 
establish that he had attended the school after 26 September 1964 
it followed that the whole of the pursuer’s claim has been 
extinguished by the long negative prescription. Had her Ladyship 
found that the pursuer had attended the school at any time after 
26 September 1964, she would have been required to consider 
whether the alleged abuse constituted a continuing act. If it did, the 
obligation would have become enforceable (and hence 
prescription would begin to run) only upon the cessation of that 
continuing act with the result that the obligation to make reparation 
would not have prescribed.  
Interestingly, (and in contrast to the approach adopted in K v 
Gilmartin’s Exrx, above) Lady Wolffe took the view that the case 
involved a serious of discrete sexual and physical assaults rather 
than one continuing wrong. Accepting the analysis offered by 
counsel for the defender, Lady Wolffe stated (at para.77): 
“Upon completion of each of these assaults, time began to run. 
This was of a different character than the kind of ongoing 
continuous “act” or default…such as that by an employer exposing 
an employee to excessive noise or to asbestos on a continuing 
basis over weeks, or months or years. If the pursuer wished to rely 
on section 11(2) to establish a continuing act, then it was 
incumbent upon him to lead evidence to do so. On the whole 
evidence, such as it was, I would not have found it proved that the 
conduct described by the pursuer was of the requisite “continuing” 
character such that time only began to run from the date of the last 
such assaultative act.”  
 
Lady Wolffe’s conclusion on prescription was sufficient to dispose 
of the case. It put “an end to the matter” with the result that “the 
issue of limitation [became] irrelevant.” (at para. 78). In the light of 
the evidence and submissions, however, Lady Wolffe considered it 
“only right” (at para.78) that she indicated her findings on the 
issues of limitation.   
 
The pursuer’s primary position on limitation was that his action was 
not time-barred. He relied upon the threat allegedly made to him 
by Brother Germanus which prevented him coming forward 
until 2013. The trigger for disclosure was a conversation at a family 
wedding when another guest extolled the virtues of the Marist 
Brothers. This troubled the pursuer who indicated that he had not 
enjoyed his time at St Columba’s. The pursuer subsequently told 
his wife of the abuse and contacted the Marist Brothers thereafter. 
He was reassured by a Brother Brendan that Brother Germanus 
had been wrong to say what he had said and that he need not 
worry about not seeing his brother again. The pursuer contacted 
his current solicitors in May 2015 and proceedings were raised 
two months later.   
Although, in his pleadings, the pursuer had relied on s.17(2) of the 
1973 Act, at the preliminary proof counsel for the pursuer sought to 
rely instead upon the “unsoundness of mind” provision of s.17(3).  
The defenders submitted that the pursuer had not proved any 
recognised or objectively verifiable mental condition sufficient to 
establish unsoundness of mind. Accordingly, to the extent that 
s.17(3) operated, it was in respect of the pursuer’s nonage only 
(and such nonage ceased when the pursuer attained the age of 18 
in October 1973).  
Counsel for the pursuer, on the other hand, submitted that the 
pursuer’s belief in the threat made by Brother Germanus engaged 
the “unsoundness of mind” provision. In support of his argument, 
counsel referred to one of the definitions of “unsound” in the 
Oxford English Dictionary, that being “not soundly based on 
reason or fact”. The threat issued to the pursuer did not conform to 
Catholic teaching. The pursuer had been led to believe a threat 
based on unsound doctrine. The threat operated as an absolute 
bar in the pursuer’s mind, and amounted to “unsoundness of mind” 
within the meaning of s.17(3) of the Act. The pursuer was 
prevented from speaking out because he believed the threat and it 
was not until 2013 that he was told that the threat was wrong. In 
counsel’s submission, the test in s.17(3) about unsoundness of 
mind was a subjective one. Counsel accepted that the pursuer had 
no diagnosable mental or psychological condition. No expert 
medical diagnosis was relied upon nor was any medical evidence 
led. Counsel argued that unsoundness of mind could be something 
short of a diagnosable mental illness. This was not a case of 
buried memory or “abused-child syndrome”. Counsel stressed that 
there was no suggestion that the pursuer had forgotten the abuse. 
The pursuer was aware of what had happened to him. He was 
aware of reports in the media in the past of sexual abuse by 
priests.   
Lady Wolffe summed up the submission in the following terms (at 
para.79): 
“it was that the pursuer had a genuine and long-held belief in the 
truth of Brother Germanus’ threat and that the assertion underlying 
that threat was unsound as a matter of Catholic orthodoxy. The 
pursuer’s belief in this threat demonstrated an “unsoundness of 
mind” and that sufficed, it was said, for the purposes of 
section 17(3).”  
Lady Wolffe rejected counsel’s argument as “untenable in the 
extreme” (at para.84) and observed that “the states of nonage and 
of unsoundness of mind are states of being that are objectively 
proved or verified” (para.85). Counsel’s submission took no 
account of the observations of Lord Osborne in McE v de La Salle 
Brothers 2007 S.C. 556 (at para.175) to the effect that “the running 
of time cannot be interrupted by a mental condition short of 
unsoundness of mind.” Moreover, counsel’s submission was 
“wholly at odds with the plain meaning and purpose of section 
17(3)” (para.84). Her Ladyship continued (at para.85): 
“In order to establish the unsoundness of mind sufficient to 
establish “legal disability”, the pursuer must prove that he suffered 
from some mental condition resulting in “legal disability”. This is 
likely to entail expert evidence to establish, objectively, that the 
claimant suffered from some medically recognised condition or 
state which was so disabling as to deprive him of legal capacity in 
the sense of being incapable of managing his affairs: see Bogan’s 
Curator Bonis v Graham 1992 SCLR 920 at 925…the evidence of 
unsoundness of mind must be such as to place the person under a 
“legal disability”. That is what section 17(3) of the Act requires. 
Proof simply of a claimant’s subjective belief, whether in 
accordance with religious teaching or not, will be insufficient.”  
Lady Wolffe concluded that the triennium had long expired. 
 
The pursuer sought to rely, in the alternative, on s.19A of the 1973 
Act. Unsurprisingly, the defenders resisted this application and 
submitted that if there was a “real possibility of significant 
prejudice” to the defender, as there was here, that would normally 
determine the matter in his favour (per Lord Hope in AS v Poor 
Sisters of Nazareth 2008 S.C. 146 at para.25). The defenders’ key 
witness was dead and a fair trial was not possible. The defenders 
placed reliance on the underlying policy and rationales for 
limitation. The pursuer, on the other hand, submitted that if he 
were not permitted to proceed with his action, which involved 
serious matters, he would be prejudiced. He referred to his 
emotions of shame, fear and cowardice. Lady Wolffe had already 
held that the obligation had prescribed but, had it not been so 
extinguished, and had limitation been a live issue, she would have 
had “no hesitation” (at para.88) in refusing to exercise the 
discretion. Generally something more than the loss of the ability to 
pursue the claim must be advanced by the pursuer especially 
where a defender proves substantial prejudice. In the instant case, 
“there was no suggestion that there was anything other than the 
pursuer’s internalised views of the threat that deterred him from 
coming forward sooner than he did” (at para.89). There was no 
period when the pursuer had forgotten or, once an adult, did not 
know that what had been done to him was wrong. No one other 
than the pursuer was responsible for the failure to raise 
proceedings sooner.  
As far as the defenders’ position was concerned, they had led 
evidence from Brother Brendan Geary, the Provincial for the 
Marist Brothers Province of West-Central Europe, to the effect that 
St Columba’s had closed in June 1982 and that there were only 
limited records of the school available. Indeed, as far as Brother 
Brendan could discover, the only records relating to the school 
was a box marked “Largs” which was comprised principally of a 
large ledger. The ledger contained two entries which appeared to 
reflect payments in respect of the pursuer’s schooling. There was 
no information about what students were at the school at the 
relevant time or about who resided in which of the two boarding 
houses. Brother Brendan had not tried to locate anyone who might 
have been involved in the school in the early 1960s. Similarly, 
there was limited information about Brother Germanus who had 
died in 1999. There were no records of any contemporaneous 
report of allegations by the pursuer in respect of 
Brother Germanus. Another individual had come forward with 
allegations concerning Brother Germanus. Those allegations, as 
well as those of the pursuer, had been reported to the police.   
Her Ladyship accepted the unchallenged evidence that, beyond 
what was spoken to, there were no other records relating to the 
school or to Brother Germanus. Brother Germanus had died long 
ago and more than five decades had elapsed since the abuse 
complained of. Her Ladyship concluded that the defenders would 
be materially prejudiced if the pursuer’s case were permitted to 
proceed.   
Drawing a parallel with SF v Quarriers 2016 S.C.L.R. 111 (see 
discussion above) Lady Wolffe stated (at para.91): “This, too, is a 
case involving allegations against a single abuser who was long 
dead. That circumstance alone meant that the defenders could 
never know what Brother Germanus’ response would have been to 
the allegations. They could not, as Lord Bannatyne aptly put it, 
“properly” advance a case that Brother Germanus did not do these 
things. In the absence of knowing Brother Germanus’ position, the 
defenders could do no more than put the pursuer to his proof. 
They could not properly lead a positive case if they had no basis to 
so do. The several rationales considered in detail by Lord 
Drummond Young in B v Murray (no. 2) applied with particular 
force to a case such as this, where an extraordinary length of time 
had passed. In all of these circumstances, no fair trial was 
possible.”  
   
In conclusion, therefore, the Lord Ordinary held that any obligation 
to make reparation to the pursuer had been extinguished by the 
long negative prescription. If she was wrong on that matter, and 
any or all of the pursuer’s case did subsist after 26 September 
1984, the pursuer’s action had suffered limitation and she would 
have refused to exercise the discretion under s.19A in his favour. 
The pursuer reclaimed. 
 
Inner House Decision [2017] CSIH 2 
The reclaiming motion came before the Second Division 
comprising the Lord Justice Clerk (Lady Dorrian), Lord Drummond 
Young and Lord Glennie. Lady Dorrian delivered the opinion of the 
court. The Second Division began by examining the limitation 
issues. As to the first limitation issue, the reclaimer argued before 
the Division that he uncritically accepted Brother Germanus’ threat 
as constituting a dogma and that his mind was accordingly 
unsound within the meaning of s.17(3) of the Act. The Division 
took the view that the Lord Ordinary had been correct to regard 
this argument as “untenable.” Lady Dorrian stated (at para.7): 
“The basis upon which she so concluded was that unsoundness of 
mind required to be established objectively, and to be such as to 
place the person under a legal disability. That is a reference to the 
precise wording of section 17(3), which provides for the 
disregarding, in computation of the triennium, of any time during 
which an injured party was “under legal disability by reason of … 
unsoundness of mind”. The key to understanding this, as the Lord 
Ordinary recognised, is that the unsoundness of mind must be 
such as to create a legal disability. A legal disability is one which 
deprives an individual of the capacity to manage his own affairs. 
Before the court could accept that a pursuer had suffered from an 
unsoundness of mind causing such an incapacity, it would expect 
to hear expert evidence as to the nature of the unsoundness, and 
crucially, that its effect had been such as to deprive an individual of 
capacity. The personal belief of a pursuer, (particularly of such a 
limited nature as that described here), however genuinely held, is 
insufficient. It is impossible to characterise the reclaimer’s deluded 
belief in this case as coming within the statutory description.” 
Having rejected the unsoundness of mind argument, the Division 
turned its attention to the issue of the statutory discretion in s.19A 
of the 1973 Act. The reclaimer argued that the Lord Ordinary had 
erred in the exercise of her discretion. It was said that she had 
erred in her assessment of the sufficiency of investigations carried 
out by the respondents and had accorded insufficient weight to the 
suggestion that a different complaint against Brother Germanus 
had been the subject of a police investigation. 
Noting the Lord Ordinary’s conclusion that the respondents would 
be materially prejudiced if the case were allowed to proceed, Lady 
Dorrian stated (at para.8): 
“More than five decades have passed since the alleged abuse. No 
complaint was made until 2014. The school closed over 34 years 
ago, in June 1982; there was unchallenged evidence that attempts 
to trace records had been unsuccessful; Brother Germanus died in 
1999. The Lord Ordinary was correct to note that any assessment 
under section 19A required to consider the issue of possible 
prejudice to the respondents. No compelling reason was advanced 
to counter-balance the severe risk of prejudice, and there is no 
basis upon which it might be said that the Lord Ordinary erred in 
the exercise of her discretion. In fact, on the material before her, in 
our view the Lord Ordinary reached the only conclusion which was 
reasonably open to her.” 
Having upheld the Lord Ordinary’s decisions on the limitation 
issues, the Division turned its attention briefly to the long negative 
prescription. It observed that there might have been an argument 
that the Lord Ordinary had paid insufficient attention to the effect of 
a judicial admission relating to the dates on which the reclaimer 
attended St Columba’s and that she erred in concluding that the 
abuse did not constitute a continuing act. Given the conclusions 
reached on the limitation points however, the prescription issue 
was academic and the court did not require to address it. 
  
Unsoundness of mind-possible reform 
The 1973 Act itself contains no definition of the term “unsoundness 
of mind.” K v Marist Brothers is the first historic abuse case in 
Scotland where an unsoundness of mind argument has been 
mobilised. Given the circumstances of the case, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the argument was rejected particularly as 
previous case law on the interpretation of the phrase suggests that 
unsoundness of mind is a somewhat extreme state. In Elliot v J & 
C Finney 1989 S.L.T. 208 Lord Sutherland suggested (at p.210) 
that it could be argued that a person in a coma was not of sound 
mind and accordingly that s.17(3) would apply. In Bogan’s Curator 
Bonis v Graham 1992 S.C.L.R. 920 (to which reference was made 
in K) the injured party had sustained severe brain damage which 
had a profound effect on the higher cognitive functions such as 
thinking, initiative and memory. Her mind had ceased to be in 
proper working order and she was held to be of unsound mind. K v 
Marist Brothers underlines the fact that unsoundness of mind must 
result in legal disability with a corresponding deprivation of 
capacity. The leading of expert testimony will usually be required 
to support any contention of unsound mind. In the absence of a 
statutory definition of the term, K certainly provides some welcome 
clarification. 
The terminology of unsoundness of mind has attracted criticism. 
The Scottish Law Commission considers the term to be outdated 
and potentially offensive and has suggested that it be replaced 
with a reference to the pursuer “being incapable within the terms of 
s.1(6) of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000.” (Scottish 
Law Commission, Report on Personal Injury Actions: Limitation 
and Prescribed Claims, (Scot. Law Com. No 207 (2007)), para 
2.71). It remains to be seen whether that recommendation will be 
implemented although the Scottish Government does appear to 
have lent its support to the commission’s proposal. (Scottish 
Government, Civil Law of Damages: Issues in Personal Injury-
Scottish Government Response to the Consultation, (Scottish 
Government, 2013), p.5. The Government has declared its 
intention to replace the references in the 1973 Act to 'unsoundness 
of mind' with references to being incapable for the purpose of 
pursuing an action for damages. It would seem inevitable however 
that the pursuer in K would have been unable to satisfy any such 
reformulated test.  
 
Conclusions 
K v Marist Brothers is the latest in a long line of cases from 
Scotland which demonstrates the difficulties faced by historic 
abuse victims in bringing forward their claims. Once again, an 
adult who claims to have been abused as a child many years ago 
has failed in an attempt to have his claims fully ventilated in court, 
his action having been thwarted by time-bar rules. On this 
occasion, however, the major plank of the pursuer’s case was not 
that he did not possess the requisite awareness of the statutory 
facts (which argument has formed the basis of so many of the 
previous cases). Instead, the pursuer sought to argue that he was 
of unsound mind, such that time did not run against him in terms of 
s.17(3) of the Act. In this connection, he relied on his subjective 
belief in a threat which was based on unsound doctrine. Perhaps 
this was a somewhat ambitious argument and, certainly, in Lady 
Wolffe’s view, it was “bound to fail” (at para.85). The case thus 
joins many other historic abuse cases in which arguments 
advanced by the pursuer in an effort to counteract the time-bar 
have similarly failed. It would seem that in terms of the existing 
legislative provisions and their interpretation, historic abuse 
survivors have limited prospects of securing compensation through 
the civil courts.  
  
The future for historic childhood abuse victims might not however 
be as bleak as the cases discussed in this article suggest. The 
Scottish Government has recognised that historic childhood abuse 
cases have unique characteristics (in particular, delayed 
acknowledgment and disclosure) which justify a special limitation 
regime. At present, a government Bill is before the Scottish 
Parliament, the purpose of which is to remove childhood abuse 
claims from the limitation regime. The Limitation (Childhood 
Abuse) (Scotland) Bill aims to improve access to justice for 
survivors of childhood abuse. The Bill, which was introduced on 
November 16, 2016 by Michael Matheson MSP, applies to any 
person who was a child (defined as someone under the age of 18) 
when the abuse occurred or began. Abuse includes physical, 
sexual or emotional abuse and the Bill is not restricted to abuse 
which occurred “in care.” The Bill will apply to rights of action which 
have accrued before it comes into force whether or not the 
limitation period has already expired. The Bill will also apply to 
cases which have been previously litigated and which have been 
decided or settled (with no payment being made in excess of 
expenses) on the basis of time bar. In order to take account of 
European Convention on Human Rights considerations, the Bill 
contains certain safeguards for defenders. The court will not allow 
an action to proceed where the defender satisfies the court (the 
onus being on him) that a fair hearing is not possible. In addition, 
where the pursuer’s right of action accrued before commencement 
of the new law, the action will not be allowed to proceed where the 
defender satisfies the court that he would be substantially 
prejudiced such as to outweigh the interest of the pursuer in 
pursuing the claim. Again, the onus lies on the defender in this 
regard. It should be noted that under the existing legislative 
regime, pursuers who seek to rely on the discretionary power of 
the court in terms of s.19A of the 1973 Act bear the onus of 
proving that it is equitable for the action to proceed. They must 
therefore proffer an explanation for the delay. Such explanations, 
as noted above, have been largely unsuccessful in the context of 
historic abuse. It is also noteworthy that while s.19A applications 
proceed on the basis that limitation is the general rule and that the 
discretion is an exception to it, the policy underlying the new Bill is 
that survivors of abuse should have access to justice. There is 
thus a considerable change of emphasis in policy terms. 
The Bill does not seek to alter the position in relation to obligations 
which had already prescribed before September 26, 1984. 
Obligations arising from abuse which occurred or ceased before 
September 26, 1964 will therefore remain extinguished. The 
Scottish Government accepts that to revive such obligations would 
be incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights 
and would offend the principle of legal certainty. 
The progress of the Bill through Parliament will be followed with 
interest, no more so than by survivors of abuse.  
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
